How steep is that hill (0 – 90 degrees)?

How your bodily state affects your perception: Simone Schnall at TEDxOxbridge

Experiment 1:
How steep is that hill (0 – 90 degrees)?

Perception of the physical environment

a resource: social support (we can rely on other people and they help us)
Does social support change perception?
Experiment 2:
Yes, just bringing to mind that you have certain social resources available changes perception.

Social power: controlling resources for other people
Experiment 3:
Roughly, how heavy is this box? Tell us in lbs.
(a group previously thought of a time when they were powerful, when they were in charge of things, when other people were relying on them)



Diffusion of Responsibility

Diffusion of Responsibility

Diffusion of responsibility occurs in large group settings and under both prosocial and antisocial conditions. In prosocial situations, individuals’ willingness to intervene or assist someone in need is inhibited by the presence of other people. The individual is under the belief that other people present will or should intervene. Thus, the individual does not perceive it as his or her responsibility to take action.

The Murder of Kitty Genovese is the classic case study for diffusion of responsibility in a prosocial situation. It has been demonstrated that the likelihood of a person offering help decreases as the number of observers present increases. This is known as the bystander effect. In addition, diffusion of responsibility is more likely to occur under conditions of anonymity.

Encore: Author Explores The Murder Of Kitty Genovese
April 5, 2016
“I didn’t want to get involved.” This entered the lexicon of ’60s America and really stuck. It became the slogan of urban anomie – the whole idea that people aren’t going to come to your aid no matter how dire your situation may be.

The attitude-behavior link

Teaching Tip Sheet: Attitudes and Behavior Change
Lisa Bowleg, PhD
Georgetown University
APA, >= 1995

The study of attitudes has had a long and preeminent history in the field of social psychology (Eagly, 1992; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
The topic of attitudes is intrinsically appealing to psychologists and non-psychologists alike; we all hold attitudes about many different abstract (e.g., ideologies such as democracy and liberalism) and concrete (e.g., people, places, and things) attitude objects.
Attitudes are “psychological tendencies that are expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 1).

Although research on attitudes is dispersed among many topics such as the measurement of attitudes, the structures of attitudes and beliefs, and theories of attitude formation and change, research on the relationship between attitudes and behavior has consistently been one of the most prominent and debatable topics in the field of social psychology (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Intuitively, the association between a person’s attitudes and her or his behavior makes sense.
However, contemporary research on attitudes has empirically demonstrated that attitudes correlate most reliably with behaviors when an aggregate of attitudes is related to an aggregate of attitude-relevant behaviors; and when a single attitude is related to a single attitude-relevant behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

attitude-behavior consistency
attitude-behavior linkage
attitude-behavior link
attitude-behavior relation

I may hallucinate

On Being Sane in Insane Places
Rosenhan, D. L. Science 179, 250−258 (1973).

… the patients often recognized normality

… may be due to the fact that physicians operate with a strong bias toward what statisticians call the Type 2 error. This is to say that physicians are more inclined to call a healthy person sick (a false positive, Type 2) than a sick person healthy (a false negative, Type 1). The reasons for this are not hard to find: it is clearly more dangerous to misdiagnose illnesss than health.

…The tag profoundly colors others’ perceptions of him and his behavior.

There is an enormous overlap in the behaviors of the sane and the insane. The sane are not “sane” all of the time. We lose our tempers “for no good reason.” We are occasionally depressed or anxious, again for no good reason. And we may find it difficult to get along with one or another person–again for no reason that we can specify.

I may hallucinate because I am sleeping … These are termed sleep-induced hallucinations, or dreams

There is by now a host of evidence that attitudes toward the mentally ill are characterized by fear, hostility, suspicion and dread.

At times, depersonalization reached such proportions that pseudopatients had the sense that they were invisible, or at least unworthy of account.

A diagnosis of cancer that has been found to be in error is cause for celebration.
But psychiatric diagnoses are rarely found to be in error.

Wikipedia entry:
Rosenhan experiment

Dream Caused by the Flight of a Bee around a Pomegranate a Second Before Awakening (Salvador Dali).

Change blindness

Magic and the Brain
Scientific American 299, 72 – 79 (2008)
Susana Martinez-Conde & Stephen L. Macknik
•Magic tricks often work by covert misdirection, drawing the spectator’s attention away from the secret “method” that makes a trick work.
•Neuroscientists are scrutinizing magic tricks to learn how they can be put to work in experimental studies that probe aspects of consciousness not necessarily grounded in current sensory reality.
•Brain imaging shows that some regions are particularly active during certain kinds of magic tricks.

Scientific American 18, 16 – 17 (2008)
Vilayanur S. Ramachandran & Diane Rogers-Ramachandran
We have eyes, yet we do not see.
PRETEND YOU ARE a member of an audience watching several people dribbling and passing a basketball among themselves. Your job is to count the number of times each player makes a pass to another person during a 60-second period.

Change-blindness as a result of ‘mudsplashes’
Nature 398, 34 (4 March 1999)
J. Kevin O’Regan, Ronald A. Rensink & James J. Clark
Change-blindness occurs when large changes are missed under natural viewing conditions because they occur simultaneously with a brief visual disruption, perhaps caused by an eye movement, a flicker, a blink, or a camera cut in a film sequence.
We have found that this can occur even when the disruption does not cover or obscure the changes.
When a few small, high-contrast shapes are briefly spattered over a picture, like mudsplashes on a car windscreen, large changes can be made simultaneously in the scene without being noticed.
This phenomenon is potentially important in driving, surveillance or navigation, as dangerous events occurring in full view can go unnoticed if they coincide with even very small, apparently innocuous, disturbances. It is also important for understanding how the brain represents the world.

Big Fish Stories Getting Littler
by Robert Krulwich
February 05, 2014

Do we share the same reality?


Do we share the same reality?

– In daily life we typically assume so …

– …but perceptions are powerfully influenced by:

  • What we happen to be paying attention to
  • Contextual factors
  • Past experience
  • Expectations
  • Motivations (we often see what we want to see and don’t see what …)
  • And many other factors

I’d like to say to young people who are struggling in their own life is:
grown-ups are doing the best that they can but they don’t have any idea what your experience is really like and to the best of your ability you have to trust your instincts …

You will outlive your whole clan!

The lesson of framing research is told in the story of a sultan who dreamed he had lost all his teeth.
Summoned to interpret the dream, the first interpreter said, “Alas! The lost teeth mean you will see your family members die.”
Enraged, the sultan ordered 50 lashes for this bearer of bad news.
When a second dream interpreter heard the dream, he explained the sultan’s good fortune: “You will outlive your whole clan!
Reassured, the sultan ordered his treasurer to go and fetch 50 pieces of gold for this bearer of good news.
On the way, the bewildered treasurer observed to the second interpreter, “Your interpretation was no different from that of the first interpreter.”
“Ah yes,” the wise interpreter replied, “but remember: What matters is not only what you say, but how you say it.”

Chapter 1. Introducing Social Psychology
Myers, D. G. (2012). Social psychology (11th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.


Common sense is usu. right–after the fact


The point is not that common sense is predictably wrong.
Rather, common sense usually is right— after the fact.
We therefore easily deceive ourselves into thinking that we know and knew more than we do and did.
And that is precisely why we need science to help us sift reality from illusion and genuine predictions from easy hindsight.

Chapter 1. Introducing Social Psychology
Myers, D. G. (2012). Social psychology (11th ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.


Hindsight bias & CPCs

Hindsight bias: an impediment to accurate probability estimation in clinicopathologic conferences.
Med Decis Making. 1988 Oct-Dec;8(4):259-64.
Dawson NV, Arkes HR, Siciliano C, Blinkhorn R, Lakshmanan M, Petrelli M.

Although clinicopathologic conferences (CPCs) have been valued for teaching differential diagnosis, their instructional value may be compromised by hindsight bias.
This bias occurs when those who know the actual diagnosis overestimate the likelihood that they would have been able to predict the correct diagnosis had they been asked to do so beforehand.

Evidence for the presence of the hindsight bias was sought among 160 physicians and trainees attending four CPCs.
Before the correct diagnosis was announced, half of the conference audience estimated the probability that each of five possible diagnoses was correct (foresight subjects).
After the correct diagnosis was announced the remaining (hindsight) subjects estimated the probability they would have assigned to each of the five possible diagnoses had they been making the initial differential diagnosis.
Only 30% of the foresight subjects ranked the correct diagnosis as first, versus 50% of the hindsight subjects (p less than 0.02).

Although less experienced physicians consistently demonstrated the hindsight bias, more experienced physicians succumbed only on easier cases.

Comment in
Hindsight: artifacts and treatment effects. [Med Decis Making. 1989]